Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control by Dominguez Martinez, S. (Silvia) & Swank, O.H. (Otto)
TI 2004-035/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
   
Polarization, Information  
Collection and Electoral Control  
 Silvia Dominguez Martinez  
Otto H. Swank  
 
Department of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and Tinbergen Institute. 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
Please send questions and/or remarks of non-
scientific nature to driessen@tinbergen.nl. 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral
Control∗
Silvia Dominguez Martinez† and Otto H. Swank
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute
March 22, 2004
Abstract
We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties
to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the repre-
sentative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated
the voting rule should encourage parties to collect information. Voting rules
that focus on the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus
on the incumbent party. When parties are policy motivated, parties have also
to be motivated to select good policies. Generally, it is easier to stimulate
policy motivated parties to collect information than office motivated parties.
However, in contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties will
sometimes select policies that conflict with the representative voter’s interest.
Key words: political competition, information, polarization
JEL Classification: D72
∗We are grateful to Klaas Beniers, Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur, Bauke Visser and seminar
participants at Erasmus University Rotterdam for comments.
†Address: Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The
Netherlands. Email: dominguezmartinez@few.eur.nl Tel: +31-10-4088953 Fax: +31-10-4089147.
1
1 Introduction
In the economics literature, polarization of preferences of political parties generally
leads to sub-optimal outcomes. The reason is twofold. First, polarization introduces
uncertainty, because it usually implies that (economic) outcomes will depend on
electoral outcomes. It is well-known that when voters are risk-averse, they prefer
a certain outcome X to a gamble for which the expected outcome is X (Myerson,
1995, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, chapter 5). Second, polarization of preferences
prevents information revelation. Schultz (1996, 1999) shows that polarization may
induce the incumbent party to bias its policies to increase its chances of re-election.
An important feature of his model is that parties have better information on how
the economy works than voters.
This paper shows that besides costs, there is a benefit of polarization of prefer-
ences: it encourages political parties to make a case for their policies. As a conse-
quence, in a polarized political system, the incentives of parties to collect information
are stronger than in a political system in which parties are purely office motivated.
When the cost of acquiring information is high relative to the rents from office, vot-
ers prefer a polarized political system to a system with office motivated parties. To
make our point, we employ a principal-agent model in which two parties compete
for office. We examine two cases: the case that the sole aim of parties is holding of-
fice, and the case that parties are ideologically driven.1 In our model, the electorate
wants parties to perform two tasks. The first task is acquiring information. The
idea is that the electorate wants parties to make a case for their policy. Each party
can search for two pieces of information: an argument that justifies intensifying
policy and an argument that justifies restricting policy. Both the incumbent party
and the opposition party can collect information.2 It is also possible that one party
searches for one piece of information and the other party searches for the other piece
1The reason for analyzing office motivated parties and policy motivated parties separately is
to highlight the forces at work. We are aware that these are extreme cases. Combining them is
straightforward, but tedious.
An other extension of the model is to allow for different types of politicians, for example, allowing
for office motivated parties and policy motivated parties. In this set-up, elections can be seen as
a mechanism used by the voter to select the type of politician that provides the largest utility to
the electorate.
2In principal-agent models of politics, the opposition party usually does not play an active
role. In the words of Ferejohn (1986, p. 14): “The importance of challengers lies entirely in their
availability”.
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of information. The second task is making a decision about policy. The incumbent
party performs this task. We examine to what extent alternative voting rules induce
political parties to pursue the voters’ interests.
We derive several results. First, in case the parties are office motivated, voting
rules should focus on information collection. The reason is that since the incumbent
party is not concerned with policy, it always selects the policy voters want. The
problem is to encourage parties to collect information. One could interpret this result
as a variation on the median voter theorem. As to the determination of policies, office
motivated parties tend to act in accordance with the wishes of a majority of voters.
Second, a voting rule that encourages the opposition party to collect information
may be at least as good as a voting rule that stimulates the incumbent party to
collect information. The intuition of this result is that charging the opposition with
the task of collecting information increases the value of office (the incumbent party
enjoys the rents from office, while the opposition party incurs the cost of effort).
This second result is similar to one of the main results of tournament theory that a
bigger spread of payoffs leads to higher effort levels (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Our
second result suggests that the role of the opposition party in a democracy might
be much bigger than “being available”.
Our next two results are related to the case that parties are policy motivated.
We show that policy motivated parties need to be given weaker incentives to collect
information than office motivated parties. The main reason is that information about
policy consequences may warrant particular policies. For instance, a party that is
biased towards selecting restrictive policy will search for arguments that support
restrictive policy. An implication of this result is that in a polarized party system,
as to information collection there is a natural division of tasks. One party collects
information about the pros of restrictive policy; the other party collects information
about the pros of intensifying policy. Finally, when parties are policy motivated, the
voter cannot always induce the incumbent party to select a policy in her interest.
At most, the voters can induce the incumbent party sometimes to select the policy
that is optimal from her point of view. The reason is that a policy motivated party
desires office because of the influence it wields in determining policy. If this influence
is not present, the party will simply select its optimal policy, taking for granted that
it will be sent away. How often the incumbent party should be allowed to select its
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own optimal policy depends on the costs of collecting information.
This article builds on the literature on electoral competition in two-party sys-
tems. On the basis of the way voters are modeled, two strands in this literature can
be distinguished. First, in spatial models of elections, each voter compares the plat-
forms of the political parties, and votes for the party whose platform yields highest
expected utility. This literature gives the conditions under which in a two-party
system the platforms of parties converge (see for a survey of this literature Mueller,
2003, chapter 11 and 12), or diverge (Wittman, 1977, Calvert, 1985, Alesina, 1988).
Second, in principal-agent models of politics, voters are modeled as a principal who
has to keep an officeholder, the agent, in check. The relationship between voters
and the officeholder is modeled as an implicit contract (or voting rule). This con-
tract stipulates the conditions under which the office holder stays in office or is
replaced by another one. This literature also has provided several insights. For
example, Ferejohn (1986) shows how voters can control moral hazard on the part of
the incumbent. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) use a principal-agent model
to analyze the pros and cons of alternative political institutions.
An attractive feature of the literature using spatial models of politics is its em-
pirical relevance. For example, Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) provide evidence that
U.S. macroeconomic data are consistent with the predictions of a model in which
parties cater to the interests of their core constituencies. Another attractive feature
of spatial models is their focus on competition: both the incumbent and the oppo-
sition party play a role. A nice feature of principal-agent models is that they build
on the basic idea of representative democracy that there might be huge benefits
of delegating authority over policy to a relatively small number of representatives.
However, a serious problem resulting from delegating authority is abuse of power.
Elections may discipline officeholders, because voters can send them away if they
do a poor job or keep them when they do a good job. Another attractive feature of
principal-agent models is that they can do justice to the complexity of the policy-
decision process. As a rule, the consequences of policy decisions are difficult to
foresee. It is in the voters’ interest that the officeholder makes informed decisions.
Voters want political parties to collect information and to act upon this informa-
tion. Principal-agent models are suitable for analyzing whether or not voters can
encourage political parties to collect information. By (1) allowing for polarization;
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(2) giving a role to the opposition party; and (3) giving parties multiple tasks, our
paper tries to combine the attractive features of the two strands in the literature on
electoral competition in two-party systems.
As mentioned before, our paper is closely related to Schultz (1996,1999) who
shows that polarization of preferences prevents information revelation and may lead
to Pareto inferior equilibria. An important difference between our model and the
ones studied by Schultz is that in Schultz it is assumed that parties have better
information about how the economy works, while in our model the distribution of
information is endogenous. In fact, we show that polarization of preferences may be
the reason why political parties are better informed than voters. Thus, in Schultz
asymmetric information and polarization lead to manipulation of information, while
in our paper polarization induces parties to collect information. As a consequence,
in our model polarized preferences may lead to Pareto superior equilibria.
Our paper is also closely related to Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). They show
that using two competing agents defending their own special interest improves the
quality of decision-making compared to using a single agent. They thus provide a
rationale for advocacy.3 Following Dewatripont and Tirole, we assume that infor-
mation is hard, i.e. once found, information can costlessly be verified. As a conse-
quence, information cannot be forged or manipulated. We are aware that much of
the information supplied by political parties is not hard. Often, it is very difficult
for the voter to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information. However, we do
believe that at elections voters want political parties to make a case for their policies.
Our assumption of hard information reflects that it is easier for a party to convince
voters when it has actual information than when it has forged information.4
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the model. Section
3 and 4 describe the equilibria of the model. In Section 3 we consider parties that
are purely office motivated and in Section 4 we consider purely policy motivated
parties. Section 5 concludes.
3Ossokina and Swank (2004) also show that voters may b ene fit f rom advo c acy. Their mo del
revolves around uncertainty about the median voter’s preferences.
4Swank and Visser (2003) show that if information is soft, it is hard for voters to encourage
office motivated politicians to collect information (see also Dur and Swank (forthcoming), and
Beniers and Swank (forthcoming) for the question how alternative types of information influence
agents’ incentives to collect information).
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2 The Model
We consider an infinitely repeated game. In each period t, a political party has to
make a decision about a public project, Xt. There are three alternatives: Xt = −1,
Xt = 0 and Xt = 1. One could interpret Xt = −1 as restricting policy, Xt = 0 as
maintaining status quo, and Xt = 1 as intensifying policy. In each period, there are
three players: party L, party R and a representative (middle of the road) voter, to
which we refer as ‘the voter’. The voter’s preferences are represented by
−E
∞X
t=0
δt (Xt − θt)2 (1)
where E is the expectations operator, δ is the discount factor (0 < δ < 1), and θt
is a stochastic term. The term θt consists of two parts: θt = θA,t + θB,t, with
θA,t ∈ {−1, 0}, Pr(θA,t = −1) = Pr (θA,t = 0) = 12 and θB,t ∈ {0, 1}, Pr(θB,t =
0) = Pr (θB,t = 1) = 12 . The terms θA,t and θB,t are independent of each other and
independent of their previous values. The idea behind the stochastic term is that
the consequences of policy are uncertain. Under full information, the voter would
prefer Xt = 1 if θt = 1, Xt = 0 if θt = 0 and Xt = −1 if θt = −1. However, the
voter does not know θA,t and θB,t. Without further information about the stochastic
terms, the voter prefers Xt = 0. Notice that the voter wants policy to be based on
θt.
In each period, policy is selected by the party which won the last elections.
Before the governing party selects policy, the two parties may collect information
about policy consequences. At cost C2, a party learns both θA,t and θB,t. At cost
C1, a party can learn the value of either θA,t or θB,t. In a policy debate, information
about policy consequences, if collected, can be communicated. We assume that if
a party learns that θA,t = −1 or θB,t = 1, it can convey this information to the
other party and the voter. For example, if a party puts forward an argument for
intensifying policy (θB,t = 1), this reveals that that party has collected information
about θB,t. However, if a party collects information about, say, θB,t and learns
that θB,t = 0, it cannot show that it has collected information. The basic idea
about the information structure is that with some probability arguments in favor
(θB,t = 1) or against (θA,t = −1) intensifying policy exist. Costs have to be made
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to find arguments. If a party puts forward an argument, then it is clear that the
party tried to find an argument. If a party does not put forward an argument, then
one cannot infer that the party did collect information. It is possible that θA,t = 0
and/or θB,t = 0.
As to the objectives of the parties, we make two assumptions. First, we assume
that parties receive rents from holding office. In the next section, the preferences of
party L are represented by
UL = E
∞X
t=0
δt (dtλ− Ct,L) (2)
where dt is a variable taking the value one if party L is in office in period t and taking
the value zero otherwise, λ denotes the value of holding office, and Ct,L ∈ {0, C1, C2}.
Analogously, the preferences of party R are represented by
UR = E
∞X
t=0
δt ((1− dt)λ− Ct,R) (3)
where Ct,R ∈ {0, C1, C2}. Next, we assume that parties have ideological preferences.
In Section 4, the preferences of party L are given by
UL = E
∞X
t=0
δt
£
−(Xt − (−1 + θt))2 − Ct,L
¤
(4)
and the preferences of party R are given by
UR = E
∞X
t=0
δt
£
−(Xt − (1 + θt))2 − Ct,R
¤
(5)
Equation (4) reflects that, without further information about θt, party L prefers
Xt = −1. Only if party L learns that θt = 1, it prefers Xt = 0. Without information
about θt, party R prefers Xt = 1. Only if θt = −1, party R prefers Xt = 0.
Equations (4) and (5) capture the main idea behind models with partisan politicians
(Hibbs, 1977, Wittman, 1977, Alesina, 1988), in which political parties differ in their
ideological preferences.
At the end of each period, the voter decides whether or not to re-elect the
incumbent party. We assume that the voter applies a simple retrospective voting
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rule. This rule conditions re-election of the incumbent on outcomes in the current
period. When voting, the voter observes the policy selected by the incumbent party,
and whether or not parties have found arguments in favor of restricting policy (θA,t =
−1) or intensifying policy (θB,t = 1). The voting rule is meant to motivate the parties
to collect information and to motivate the incumbent party to select the policy that
maximizes equation (1).
Let us summarize the timing in each period. (1) The party that won the elections
in period t− 1 takes office. (2) Nature chooses θA,t and θB,t. (3) Each party decides
whether to learn the value of either θA,t or θB,t, to learn both values or none of
them. (4) The parties reveal the information they collected. (5) The incumbent
party selects policy. (6) Elections are held.
3 Office Motivated Parties
In this section we identify the conditions under which the voter can induce political
parties to pursue her interest in case parties are purely office motivated. From the
voter’s point of view, the first best situation is attained if (i) information about both
θA,t and θB,t is collected, and, (ii) given the available information, Xt maximizes (1).
With office motivated parties, the incumbent party has never an incentive to select a
policy that does not accord with the voter’s interest. For this reason, in this section
we assume that the incumbent always selects the policy that maximizes (1), given
the available information about θt. The problem that remains is the design of a
voting rule that gives incentives to the parties to collect full information.
The idea behind any voting rule is that good behavior must be rewarded and
bad behavior must be punished. Clearly, collecting full information is good, and
not collecting information is bad. The main problem is that the voter does not
always observe whether or not a party really collected information. A party can
only show that it collected information if it found arguments in favor and/or against
intensifying policy.
With office motivated parties, voting rules can be distinguished on the basis of
two features. The first feature is the party on which the rule focuses. For example,
if a rule focuses on the incumbent party, that rule stipulates what the incumbent
party should do to get re-elected. The second feature of the voting rule concerns
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the question of how demanding the voting rule is.
We first consider a voting rule that focuses only on the incumbent party and is
highly demanding. After that, we will discuss voting rules that demand less of the
incumbent party or that focus (partially) on the opposition party:
Voting rule I: Re-elect the incumbent party if and only if it showed that θA,t = −1
and θB,t = 1.
To examine the consequences of this voting rule, we identify the conditions un-
der which it induces the incumbent to collect full information. Notice that if the
incumbent party collects full information, the voter attains the first-best situation.
A direct implication is that once we have shown that collecting full information is
an optimal reply to voting rule I, we have identified an equilibrium of the game.
Suppose that in each period, the incumbent collects full information. Does the
incumbent have an incentive to deviate? It is easy to see that collecting partial
information cannot be an optimal response to voting rule I. The reason is that
collecting partial information is costly but never leads to re-election under voting
rule I. In other words, collecting partial information is dominated by collecting no
information. Therefore, if an incumbent deviates, it collects no information. If the
incumbent collects no information, its payoff equals
λ+ V NEt+1 (6)
where V NEt+1 is the equilibrium continuation value for the incumbent if it is not re-
elected. If the incumbent collects full information, then voting rule I implies that
with probability 1
4
it will be re-elected. Thus, collecting full information delivers a
payoff equal to
λ− C2 +
1
4
V ELt+1 +
3
4
V NEt+1 (7)
where V ELt+1 is the equilibrium continuation value for the incumbent if it is re-elected.
From (6) and (7) it immediately follows that the incumbent prefers collecting
full information to collecting no information if
C2 ≤
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(8)
In the Appendix we show that V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ− C2). Lemma 1 summarizes
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our discussion about rule I.
Lemma 1 Suppose voting rule I. Furthermore suppose that C2 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
,
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ− C2). Then, (i) the opposition party does not collect
information; (ii) the incumbent party collects full information.
Proof. The proof of this lemma and other lemmas can be found in the Appendix.
Basically Lemma 1 states that if parties care sufficiently about holding office,
the cost of collecting information is sufficiently low, and parties are patient enough,
then voting rule I leads to a first-best situation for the voter. Of course a high λ is
not always good. For example, Dur (2002) shows that electoral concerns may induce
parties not to repeal policies that hurt society.
Let us now consider a less demanding voting rule:
Voting rule II: Re-elect the incumbent party if it showed that θA,t = −1 and
θB,t = 1, or it showed that θA,t = −1, or it showed that θB,t = 1.
Along the same lines as we derived (8), we can derive that under voting rule II
the incumbent prefers collecting full information to collecting no information if
C2 ≤
3
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(9)
with V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ (λ− C2) (see the Appendix). Clearly condition (9) is weaker
than condition (8). The reason is that if the incumbent party collects full information
under voting rule II, it will be re-elected with probability 3
4
. Therefore, the expected
benefits of collecting full information are higher under rule II than under rule I.
Since showing partial information suffices for getting re-elected, voting rule II has
the drawback that the incumbent party may be tempted to collect partial rather
than full information.5 If the incumbent party collects partial information in period
t, its expected payoff equals
λ− C1 +
1
2
V ELt+1 +
1
2
V NEt+1 (10)
5We assume that a political party that collects full information, searches for both pieces of
information simultaneously. If political parties were allowed to collect information sequentially,
voting rule II would induce the parties to stop searching for information, once they have found a
piece of information.
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Collecting full information yields a higher expected payoff than collecting partial
information if
C2 − C1 ≤
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(11)
Equation (11) shows that the smaller is the difference between C2 and C1, the weaker
is the incumbent’s incentive to collect partial information. Lemma 2 describes the
conditions under which voting rule II induces the incumbent party to collect full
information.
Lemma 2 Suppose voting rule II. Furthermore, suppose that C2 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
and C2 − C1 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
, with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ (λ− C2). Then, (i) the
opposition party does not collect information; (ii) the incumbent party collects full
information.
It is easy to see that both conditions (9) and (11) are weaker than (8). Hence,
voting rule II leads to full information collection for a wider range of parameters
than voting rule I. To put it differently, voting rule II (weakly) dominates voting
rule I.
Voting rule I and II focus on the incumbent party. The same type of voting rules
can be applied to the opposition party. Voting rule II applied to the opposition
party can be formulated as6
Voting rule III: Elect the opposition party if it showed that θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1,
or it showed that θA,t = −1, or it showed that θB,t = 1.
Clearly, under voting rule III, the incumbent party has no incentive to collect
information. Lemma 3 presents the conditions under which voting rule III induces
the opposition party to collect full information.
Lemma 3 Suppose voting rule III. Furthermore suppose that C2 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
and C2 − C1 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
, with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ+ C2). Then, (i) the
incumbent party does not collect information; (ii) the opposition party collects full
information.
6Voting rule I can also be rewritten for the opposition party. It is easy to show that such a rule
is weakly dominated by voting rule III.
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Now we can compare voting rule II to voting rule III. Lemma 2 and 3 show
that under voting rule III holding office is more attractive than under voting rule
II, if (2− δ)C2 > δλ. The reason is that under voting rule III, the incumbent party
enjoys the rents from holding office, while the opposition party incurs the cost of
collecting information. Therefore, the value of holding office increases as the costs
of collecting full information increase. In the case that voting rule II is applied, the
opposite is true.
A comparison between the conditions in the Lemma 2 and 3 shows that voting
rule III dominates voting rule II. Hence, the conditions in Lemma 3 are weaker than
the conditions in Lemma 2. This means that the incentives to collect information
are stronger if the opponent incurs the cost of information, while the incumbent
enjoys the rents from office. We can compare this result to one of the main re-
sults in tournament theory. Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that giving a relatively
high salary to an individual in a senior position, induces individuals in more junior
positions to exert higher effort.
Finally, consider a voting rule which focuses on both the incumbent party and
the opposition party.7
Voting rule IV: Elect the opposition if and only if it showed that θB,t = 1, while
the incumbent did not show θA,t = −1.
Notice that under rule IV the incumbent is re-elected if both the incumbent
and the opponent supply information. Consequently, under voting rule IV both the
incumbent party and the opposition party must have an incentive to collect partial
information. Let us first check under which conditions the incumbent party has no
incentive to shirk. Collecting partial information yields an expected payoff equal to
λ− C1 +
3
4
V ELt+1 +
1
4
V NEt+1
Not collecting information yields an expected payoff equal to
λ+ 1
2
V ELt+1 +
1
2
V NEt+1
7There are several variants on voting rule IV. For example, the voting rule can require that the
opposition party must show that θB,t = 1. Another variant is that the opposition party is elected
unless the incumbent party shows that θA,t = −1. It is straightforward to check that all such
variants lead to the same type of conditions for full information collection.
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It is now easy to see that collecting partial information yields a higher payoff than
collecting no information if
C1 ≤
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
2δ
2− δλ (12)
An identical condition can be derived for the opposition party. Lemma 4 presents
the conditions for which voting rule IV leads to full information collection.
Lemma 4 Suppose voting rule IV. Furthermore suppose that C1 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δλ. Then, (i) the incumbent party collects information about
θA,t and (ii) the opposition party collects information about θB,t.
A comparison between Lemma 3 and 4 shows that without further information
about C1 and C2, one cannot say whether or not voting rule III dominates voting
rule IV. If C2 is close to C1, then rule III dominates rule IV. If instead C2 is much
higher than C1, then one should avoid that one party has to collect all information.
Consequently, rule IV dominates rule III. The following proposition summarizes the
main results of this section.
Proposition 1 Suppose parties are purely office motivated. Then, a voting rule that
only induces the incumbent to collect information (voting rule I and II) is dominated
by a voting rule that requires that the opposition collects information (voting rule
III). If C1 ≤ 13C2, then the optimal voting rule induces both the incumbent and the
opposition to collect partial information.
So far, we have focused on voting rules which lead to full information collection.
If the conditions are such that none of the voting rules leads to full information
collection, then the voter prefers the incumbent party always to choose Xt = 0. To
see why, suppose an equilibrium in which one of the parties collects information
about θA,t, but no party investigates θB,t. Then, the parameters of the model are
such that the voter weakly prefersXt = 0, irrespective of the value of θA,t. Therefore,
if only one term is investigated, the voter does not want that the information about
this term will affect policy. The implication is that from the voter’s point of view,
a voting rule that leads to no information collection is at least as good as a voting
rule that leads to partial information collection. Hence, if the conditions for voting
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rules III and IV are violated, one optimal voting rule is re-elect the incumbent party
if it chooses Xt = 0.
4 Policy Motivated Parties
This section describes the conditions under which the voter can induce political
parties to pursue her interest in case parties are purely policy motivated [see eqs.
(4) and (5)]. In contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties have
an incentive to select policies which do not always accord with the voter’s interest.
For this reason, a voting rule should not only give incentives to the parties to collect
information, but should also give incentives to the incumbent party to select the
policy which, given the available information, maximizes (1). An implication is that
a voting rule should mainly focus on the incumbent party.
Before analyzing alternative voting rules in detail, we first present two more
general results.
Lemma 5 The voter (weakly) prefers a situation in which party L examines θA,t
and party R examines θB,t to a situation in which the incumbent party examines
both θA,t and θB,t, and the other party examines nothing.
The reason for Lemma (5) is that policy motivated parties may have an incentive
to conceal information. Suppose, for instance, that the incumbent party examines
both θA,t and θB,t, and discovers that θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1. Furthermore suppose
that party L is in office. Then, the incumbent party prefers Xt = −1 while the
voter prefers Xt = 0. As a consequence, for a reasonable voting rule, party L has no
incentive to reveal that θB,t = 1. It is easy to verify that for any reasonable voting
rule, neither party L nor party R has an incentive to conceal information if party L
examines θA,t and party R examines θB,t.
Lemma 6 There does not exist a voting rule that induces (i) party L to investigate
θA,t, (ii) party R to investigate θB,t, and (iii) the incumbent party to select the policy
that maximizes the voter’s payoff function given the available information.
To understand Lemma 6, suppose that a voting rule exists that does lead to
a first-best situation from the voter’s point of view. Call this voting rule V. A
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direct implication of rule V is that the equilibrium continuation value of the game
is independent of the election result. To put it differently, the payoff to a party is
independent of whether or not it wins the next election. But then the incumbent
party has no reason not to select its first-best policy.
An implication of Lemma 6 is that the incumbent must gain something from
promoting the voter’s interest. To put it in a more popular way, there should
be something in it for the incumbent party. Thus, a voting rule must allow the
incumbent to sometimes pursue its own interest. However, as we will show the voter
should not be too generous. The voter might be better off if no decision is made
and the status quo is retained in each period. Then, the voter achieves an expected
utility of −2
4
. Hence, the voter only has an incentive to delegate the policy decision
to political parties, if it yields and expected utility larger than −2
4
.
With policy motivated parties, voting rules can be distinguished on the basis of
one feature, namely how demanding the voting rule is. In Lemma 6 we have already
shown that the voter can never achieve a first-best situation. Below, we discuss some
voting rules that permit the incumbent party sometimes to pursue its own interest.
Let us first consider voting rule VI.
Voting rule VI: Re-elect the incumbent party unless Xt 6= 0 if θt = 0.
Under voting rule VI the incumbent party is allowed to select its optimal policy
if θt = −1 or θt = 1. However, the voter wants the incumbent party to select her
optimal policy if θt = 0. To examine how voting rule VI shapes the policy decision,
suppose that party L is in office and that both parties collect information.8 Clearly,
unless θt = 0, party L will select the policy which maximizes its current payoff,
for there is no trade-off between current and future policy. Hence, party L chooses
Xt = −1 if θt = −1, andXt = 0 if θt = 1. If θt = 0, thenXt = −1 yields an expected
payoff to party L equal to −C1+V NEt+1 , while Xt = 0 delivers −C1+V ELt+1 −1. Hence,
when θt = 0, party L choosesXt = 0 if V ELt+1−V NEt+1 ≥ 1. Notice that if this condition
holds, party L will always win the next election. If V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 < 1, then rule VI
does not give incentives to party L to behave in accordance with the voter’s interest.
Let us now identify the conditions under which party L investigates θA,t and party
R investigates θB,t. Suppose an equilibrium in which both parties investigate and
8The analysis of the case that party R is in office is analogous.
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select policy in accordance with voting rule VI. What are the incentives for party L
to deviate? Investigating yields a payoff equal to −3
4
−C1+V ELt+1 , if V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 ≥ 1.
To derive the payoff to party L if it does not investigate θA,t, we first have to
determine which policy it would select in that case. Notice that if party L did not
collect information, the voter would conclude that party L found θA,t = 0. Suppose
that θB,t = 1. Then, it is optimal for party L to select Xt = 0. Now suppose
that θB,t = 0. Then, party L faces a trade-off between optimal policy in period t
(Xt = −1) and losing the next election on the one hand and suboptimal policy in
period t (Xt = 0) and winning the next election on the other hand. It is easy to
verify that if party L is sufficiently concerned with the future (V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 = δ1−δ >
2),9 then it chooses Xt = 0. In that case not investigating θA,t yields a payoff to
party L equal to −6
4
+ V ELt+1 . Hence, given that V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 2, party L prefers
investigating to not investigating if C1 ≤ 34 . In case V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 < 2, then party
L selects Xt = −1 if θB,t = 0, and not investigating θA,t yields a payoff equal to
−1
2
+ 1
2
V ELt+1+ 12V NEt+1 . Consequently, party L prefers investigating to not investigating
if C1 ≤ 12
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
− 1
4
.
We have now identified the conditions under which the incumbent party collects
information. Let us now analyze under which conditions the opposition party, say
party R, collects information. It is easy to verify that investigating θB,t yields an
expected payoff to party R equal to −7
4
− C1 + V NEt+1 , while not investigating yields
−10
4
+ V NEt+1 . Hence, party R investigates if C1 ≤ 34 .
Lemma 7 summarizes our discussion about voting rule VI.
Lemma 7 Suppose voting rule VI. If 2
3
< δ < 1 and C1 ≤ 34 , or
1
2
< δ < 2
3
and
C1 ≤ 12
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
− 1
4
, with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ , then (i) the incumbent party
collects information about θA,t and (ii) the opposition party collects information
about θB,t, and (iii) the incumbent party implements Xt = −1 if θt = −1, Xt = 0 if
θt = 0 and Xt = 0 if θt = 1.
Basically, Lemma 7 states that if the costs of collecting information are suffi-
ciently low, and parties are sufficiently concerned with the future, then voting rule
VI leads to full information collection, and party L (R) selects policy in accordance
9See the Appendix for the proof that V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ
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with the voter’s interest unless θt = 1 (θt = −1). If the conditions presented in
Lemma 7 are satisfied, then the voter’s expected payoff equals −1
4
in each period.
Under voting rule VI, the incumbent party, say party L, is always re-elected if
the conditions in Lemma 7 are satisfied. Also in the case that the incumbent party
implements Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1, he is re-elected. A variant of this voting
rule is a voting rule under which the opposition is elected if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1.
Let us consider this rule.
Voting rule VII: Suppose party L is in office. Then re-elect the incumbent party
if it implements the policy that maximizes the voter’s utility given the available in-
formation unless θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1; if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1, the opposition
party is elected.
If party R is in office, then re-elect the incumbent party if it implements the policy
that maximizes the voter’s utility given the available information unless θA,t = −1
and θB,t = 0; if θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 0, the opposition party is elected.
Along the same lines as we derived the conditions in Lemma 7, we can derive the
conditions under which rule VII induces parties to investigate the full consequences
of policy (see Appendix). These conditions are presented in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 Suppose voting rule VII. If 2
3
< δ < 1 and C1 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
− 1
4
,
with V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ , then (i) the incumbent party collects information about θA,t
and (ii) the opposition party collects information about θB,t, and (iii) the incumbent
party implements Xt = −1 if θt = −1, Xt = 0 if θt = 0 and Xt = 0 if θt = 1.
A comparison between the conditions in Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 shows that
voting rule VII dominates voting rule VI if δ > 4
5
. This means that, if the future
is very important, voting rule VII gives a stronger incentive to parties to collect
information. The reason is that under voting rule VII the probability of being re-
elected depends on the information the incumbent has collected. Under voting rule
VI, on the other hand, the probability of being re-elected is independent of the
information presented by the incumbent if δ > 2
3
. Hence, under voting rule VII the
incumbent has a stronger incentive to collect information. Also the opponent party
has a stronger incentive to collect information. Under voting rule VI, the opponent
only collects information to influence the choice of policy made by the incumbent
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party. Under voting rule VII collecting information has a second objective. By
collecting information the opponent party can increase the probability of being in
office next period and in this way be able to determine future policy.
Apart from voting rules VI and VII, there are several other voting rules that
may give incentives to policy motivated parties. Like rule VI and VII, two similar
voting rules yield an expected payoff to the voter equal to −1
4
in each period. We
first briefly discuss those rules.
Voting rule VIII: Re-elect the incumbent party if it implements the policy that
maximizes the voter’s utility given the available information unless θA,t = θB,t = 0;
if θA,t = θB,t = 0, the incumbent is always re-elected.
A direct implication of voting rule VIII is that the incumbent party selects a
policy which conflicts with the voter’s preferences if θA,t = θB,t = 0. Rule VIII is
clearly a variant of rule VI. For one event, the incumbent party may do what it
wishes. Because voting rules VI and VIII are essentially the same, they work under
the same conditions.
A variation on voting rule VIII is a voting rule according to which the opposition
party is elected if θA,t = θB,t = 0. Call this voting rule IX. It is easy to show that
voting rule IX is dominated by voting rule VIII. The reason is that under rule IX,
the opposition party is elected if no information is presented. Hence, under rule IX
the opposition has a weaker incentive to collect information than under rule VIII.
Until now we have considered voting rules that yield an expected payoff to the
voter equal to −1
4
. Next we want to determine what happens if the conditions in
lemmas 7 and 8 are not satisfied. This means that either the future is less important
or collecting information is too costly. We focus on the situation in which the
future is less important.10 In this situation the incumbent has a weaker incentive to
implement the policy that maximizes voter’s utility given the available information.
Consequently, the voter has to allow the incumbent to pursue its own interest more
often. Let us consider the following voting rule.
Voting rule X: Re-elect the incumbent party if it implements Xt = −1 if θA,t = −1
and Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0.
10The case in which collecting information is too costly leads to similar results.
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Voting rule X allows the incumbent to deviate in two cases, namely if θA,t = −1
and θB,t = 1 and if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1. Hence, voting rule X allows the incumbent
party to ignore θB,t = 1. Consequently, the opponent has no incentive to collect
information. The reason is that collecting information has no effect for the opponent.
Lemma 9 presents the results under which voting rule X induces the incumbent to
follow the interests of the electorate.
Lemma 9 Suppose voting rule X. Furthermore suppose that 1
3−C1 < δ < 1 and
C1 < 1. Then, (i) the incumbent party collects information about θA,t and (ii) the
opposition party collects no information. With respect to policy, the incumbent party
implements Xt = −1 if θA,t = −1 and Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0.
A comparison of Lemma 9 and the other lemmas in this section, shows that
the conditions under which the incumbent pursues the interest of the electorate are
weaker in lemma 9. However, we cannot conclude that voting rule X dominates the
other rules. The reason is that the voter achieves a lower expected utility under
voting rule X. If the conditions in Lemma 9 are satisfied, the voter achieves an
expected utility of −2
4
. This means that in order to make a less patient incumbent
party pursue the interests of the electorate, the voter has to give up some utility.
We have already shown that if no policy decision is made, the payoff to the voter
equals −2
4
. This means that no policy decision leads to at least as good results as
voting rules like rule X.11
The following proposition summarizes the main results of this section.
Proposition 2 Suppose parties are purely policy motivated. Then, the voter can
never achieve a first-best outcome. The voter can achieve an expected utility equal
to −1
4
, if parties care enough about the future (δ > 1
2
). If δ > 4
5
, then a voting rule
in which the incumbent is not always re-elected (rule VII) dominates a voting rule
that always re-elects the incumbent (rule VI). For 1
2
< δ < 4
5
, the opposite is true.
If the conditions of rule VI and VII are not satisfied, the voter is better off making
the decision herself. This leads to an expected utility equal to −2
4
.
11There are several variants on voting rule X. These variants lead to an expected utility of at
most −24 . The intuition is that in order to have a less patient incumbent party pursue the voter’s
interest, the voter has to apply a less demanding voting rule as compared to the other voting rules
in this section. A less demanding voting rule, yields a lower expected utility to the voter. A similar
argument applies if collecting information is too costly.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed to what extent voters can motivate political parties to
collect information about policy consequences and to select good policies. We have
designed a model in which the incumbent party determines policy. The consequences
of policies are uncertain. To reduce this uncertainty both the incumbent and the
opposition party can collect information. With respect to the preferences of parties
we have distinguished two situations. Parties are either office motivated or policy
motivated.
We have shown that office motivated parties choose policies that, given the avail-
able information, promote the interest of the representative voter. Information col-
lection requires that parties sufficiently value office. One interesting result is that
voting rules that focus on both the incumbent party and the opposition party per-
form at least as well as voting rules that exclusively focus on the incumbent party.
In case parties are policy motivated, the voter does not always need to induce
parties to collect information. As parties derive utility from the implemented policy,
they already have an incentive to collect information. The problem with policy
motivated parties is that they tend to select sub-optimal policies. The voter must
induce the incumbent party to implement the policy that maximizes her utility. An
interesting result is that if parties are policy motivated, the voter can never achieve a
first-best outcome. The incumbent must gain something from promoting the voter’s
interest.
We have argued that if parties are policy motivated, the voter never achieves a
first-best outcome. In contrast, if parties are office motivated the voter can achieve a
first-best outcome. It is too early to conclude from these results that a system with
policy motivated parties is inferior to a system with office motivated parties. With
office motivated parties, attaining the first best situation requires that the rents of
holding office are large enough. This raises the question where do these rents come
from? Possibly these rents are paid by the voter as in Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(1997). Then, a system with policy motivated parties might be superior to a system
with office motivated parties.
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6 Appendix
Appendix A: Present discounted value of office
In this appendix we determine the present discounted value of office. Suppose that
in period 1 party L will be in office. With a probability of α, the incumbent is
re-elected in each future period. Let V ELt+1 be the equilibrium continuation value for
the party if he is elected in period t and V NEt+1 be the equilibrium continuation value
for the party if he is sent home in period t. Let ρt be the probability that party L
is in office in period t, then
ρt+1 = αρt + (1− α) (1− ρt)
= (2α− 1) ρt + (1− α) (13)
The general solution of this first-order difference equation is
ρt = A (2α− 1)
t +
(1− α)
1− (2α− 1)
= A (2α− 1)t + 1
2
(14)
where A is an arbitrary constant. Recall that in period t = 1, party L is in office,
implying that for t = 1, ρ1 = 1. Now A directly follows from (14) A = 12
1
(2α−1) .
Hence the particular solution of (14) is
ρt =
1
2
(2α− 1)t−1 + 1
2
It is now straightforward to calculate V ELt+1 :
V ELt+1 =
∞X
t=1
δt
µ
1
2
(2α− 1)t−1 + 1
2
¶¡
U I − UO
¢
=
(1− αδ) δ
(1− δ) (1− 2αδ + δ)
¡
U I − UO
¢
where U I is the utility a party receives if he holds office and UO is the utility a party
receives if he does not hold office.
Now suppose that in t = 0 party L is not re-elected. Then, in period t + 1 party
R will enter office, implying that ρ1 = 0. From (14) it follows that A = −12
1
(2α−1) .
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Hence, the particular solution of (14) is
ρt = −
1
2
(2α− 1)t−1 + 1
2
We can now write the equilibrium continuation value if party L is not re-elected in
period t = 0 as
V NEt+1 =
∞X
t=1
δt
µ
−1
2
(2α− 1)t−1 + 1
2
¶¡
U I − UO
¢
=
(δ − αδ) δ
(1− δ) (1− 2αδ + δ)
¡
U I − UO
¢
Hence,
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δ
1− 2αδ + δ
¡
U I − UO
¢
(15)
Appendix B: Proofs of lemmas
In this appendix we provide the proofs of the lemmas that are discussed in the paper.
Proof of Lemma 1: A proof was provided in the text above the lemma. The
present discounted value of office, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 , can be determined making use of
equation (15). Under voting rule I the incumbent party is re-elected if and only if he
shows that θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1. Suppose that in equilibrium the party in office
collects full information and the opponent collects no information. In equilibrium,
the probability that the incumbent is elected equals α = Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 1) =
1
4
. The utility a party gets if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals λ − C2 and the utility
he gets if he is out of office equals 0. Substituting this into equation (15) gives
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ− C2). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: A proof was provided in the text above the lemma. Again,
V ELt+1−V NEt+1 follows from (15). Under voting rule II the incumbent party is re-elected
if he shows that θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1 , or it showed that θA,t = −1, or it showed
that θB,t = 1. Suppose that in equilibrium the party in office collects full information
and the opponent collects no information. In equilibrium, the probability that the
incumbent is elected equals α = Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 1)+Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 0)+
Pr (θA,t = 0, θB,t = 1) = 34 . The utility a party achieves if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals λ − C2 and the utility he achieves if he is out of office equals 0. Hence,
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ (λ− C2). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 3: Along the same lines as we derived the conditions in lemma
2, we can derive the conditions in lemma 3. The main difference is that now the
opponent has to decide whether or not to collect information. Under voting rule
III, the opponent prefers collecting full information to collecting no information if
C2 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
. He prefers to collect full information to collecting partial
information if C2 − C1 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
. The incumbent has no incentive to
collect information. Next, we have to determine V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 . Under voting rule III
the incumbent party is only re-elected if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 0. Suppose that in
equilibrium the opposition party collects full information and the incumbent party
collects no information. In equilibrium, the probability that the incumbent is elected
equals α = Pr (θA,t = 0, θB,t = 0) = 14 . The utility a party receives if he holds office¡
= U I
¢
equals λ and the utility he receives if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −C2.
Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ+ C2). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: A proof was provided in the text above the lemma. The
present discounted value of holding office, V ELt+1−V NEt+1 , can be determined making use
of (15). Under voting rule IV the incumbent party is re-elected if θA,t = 0 and θB,t =
0, θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 0 or θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1. Suppose that in equilibrium
each party collects partial information. In equilibrium, the probability that the
incumbent is elected equals α = Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 1)+Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 0)+
Pr (θA,t = 0, θB,t = 0) = 34 . The utility a party receives if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals λ − C1 and the utility he receives if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −C1.
Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δλ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7: A proof was provided in the text above the lemma. Again,
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 can be determined making use of (15). Under voting rule VI the
incumbent party is re-elected if he implements Xt = 0 if θt = 0. Suppose that in
equilibrium each party collects partial information and that V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 > 1. Then,
in equilibrium, the probability that the incumbent is re-elected equals α = 1. The
utility a party receives if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals −3
4
− C1 and the utility he
receives if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −7
4
− C1. Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8: Suppose voting rule VII. Furthermore suppose that in equi-
librium each party collects partial information. First we determine which policy the
incumbent party implements given the value of the stochastic term. The incumbent
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party implements Xt = −1 if θt = −1 and Xt = 0 if θt = 1. If θt = 0, the incumbent
implements Xt = 0 if and only if V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, else he implements Xt = −1.
Now, we can determine the expected payoff if the incumbent investigates θA,t and
the opponent investigates θB,t. If V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, the expected payoff to the in-
cumbent equals −3
4
−C1 + 34V ELt+1 +
1
4
V NEt+1 and the expected payoff to the opponent
equals −7
4
− C1 + 14V ELt+1 +
3
4
V NEt+1 .
To identify the conditions under which both parties collect partial information, we
have to determine whether or not the incumbent has an incentive to deviate. Let
us determine the expected payoff achieved by the incumbent if he does not collect
information. In this case the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if θB,t = 1. If θB,t = 0,
the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if and only if V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 > 2, else he implements
Xt = −1. If V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 2, the expected payoff to the incumbent equals −64 +
2
4
V ELt+1+ 24V NEt+1 . If V ELt+1−V NEt+1 < 2, the expected payoff to the incumbent equals−
2
4
+
V NEt+1 . Hence, the incumbent collects partial information if (i) V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 2 and
C1 ≤ 34+
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
, and, (ii) 1 < V ELt+1−V NEt+1 < 2 and C1 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
−
1
4
.
Next, we can determine whether or not the opponent has an incentive to deviate. Let
us determine the expected payoff to the opponent if he does not collect information.
Then the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0 and Xt = −1 if θA,t = −1. The
expected payoff to the opponent equals −10
4
+ V NEt+1 . Hence, the opponent collects
partial information if and only if C1 ≤ 34 +
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
.
Finally, we can determine the relative value of holding office. Suppose that in
equilibrium each party collects partial information and that V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1.
Then, in equilibrium, the probability that the incumbent is re-elected equals α =
Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 1) + Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 0) + Pr (θA,t = 0, θB,t = 0) = 34 . The
utility a party receives if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals −3
4
− C1 and the utility he
receives if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −7
4
− C1. Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ .
Because 0 < δ < 1, the following always holds V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ < 2. Therefore,
we only need to consider the case in which 1 < V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 < 2, say 23 < δ < 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9: Suppose voting rule X. Furthermore suppose that in equilib-
rium the incumbent investigates θA,t and the opponent does not collect information.
First we determine which policy the incumbent party implements given the value of
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the stochastic term. The incumbent implements Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0 and Xt = −1 if
θA,t = −1. The expected payoff to the incumbent equals −24 + V ELt+1 − C1 and the
expected payoff to the opponent equals −10
4
+ V NEt+1 .
To identify the conditions under which the incumbent collects partial information,
we have to determine whether or not the incumbent has an incentive to deviate. Let
us determine the expected payoff achieved by the incumbent if he does not collect
information. In this case the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, else
he implements Xt = −1. The expected payoff to the incumbent if V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1
equals −6
4
+V ELt+1 . Hence, the incumbent collects partial information if V ELt+1−V NEt+1 >
1 and C1 ≤ 1.
Next we can determine whether or not the opponent has an incentive to deviate. Let
us determine the expected payoff to the opponent if he collects partial information.
In this case the incumbent implements Xt = −1 if θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 0, Xt = −1
if θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1 and Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1. If θA,t = 0 and
θB,t = 0, the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if and only if V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, else
he implements Xt = −1. If V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, the expected payoff to the opponent
equals −10
4
+ V NEt+1 − C1.
Finally, we can determine the relative value of holding office. Suppose that in
equilibrium the incumbent party collects full information and the opponent does
not collect information and V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1. Then, in equilibrium, the probability
that the incumbent is re-elected equals α = 1. The utility a party achieves if he
holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals−2
4
−C1 and the utility he gets if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −10
4
. Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ (2− C1). Q.E.D.
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